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We explore an approach to verification of programs via program transformation applied to an in-
terpreter of a programming language. A specialization technique known as Turchin’s supercompi-
lation is used to specialize some interpreters with respect to the program models. We show that
several safety properties of functional programs modeling a class of cache coherence protocols can
be proved by a supercompiler and compare the results with our earlier work on direct verification via
supercompilation not using intermediate interpretation.
Our approach was in part inspired by an earlier work by DeE. Angelis et al. (2014-2015) where
verification via program transformation and intermediate interpretation was studied in the context of
specialization of constraint logic programs.
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1 Introduction
We show that a well-known program specialization task called the first Futamura projection [11, 37, 17]
can be used for indirect verifying some safety properties of functional program modeling a class of
non-deterministic parameterized computing systems specified in a language that differs from the object
programming language treated by a program specializer deciding the task. Let a specializer transforming
programs written in a language L and an interpreter IntM of a language M , which is also implemented
in L , be given. Given a program p0 written in M , the mentioned task is to specialize the interpreter
IntM(p0,d) with respect to its first argument, while the data d of the program p0 is unknown.
Our interest in this task has been inspired by the following works [2, 4] especially the presentation
given by the authors of these articles at the Workshop VPT-2015. The authors work in terms of constraint
logic programming (CLP), where the constraint language is the linear arithmetic inequalities imposed
on integer values of variables. They use partial deduction [22] and CLP program specialization [9, 3]
methods for specializing an interpreter of a C-like language with respect to given programs, aiming at
verification of the C-like imperative specifications with respect to the postconditions defined in CLP
and defining the same functions (relations) as done by the corresponding C-like programs. Additionally
to the CLP program specialization developed by DeE. Angelis et al. and called VeriMAP [3] they
also use external satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers. We would also refer to an earlier work
by J. P. Gallagher et al. [12] reported on a language-independent method for analyzing the imperative
programs via intermediate interpretation by a logic programming language. The success of such a method
depends eventually on the analysis tools available for the logic programming languages. Note that the
transformation examples given in the papers [12, 9, 3] presenting the both mentioned approaches deal
with neither function nor constructor application stack in the interpreted programs.
∗The second author was supported by RFBR, research project No. 17-07-00285 a
2 Verifying Programs via Intermediate Interpretation
In this paper we focus our attention on self-sufficient methods for specialization of functional pro-
grams, aiming at proving some safety properties of the programs. Such a property problem is a (un)rea-
chability problem meaning that when a program is running, an unsafe program configuration cannot be
reached from any initial configuration. We consider a program specialization method called Turchin’s
supercompilation [38, 37, 36, 18] and study potential capabilities of the method for verifying the safety
properties of the functional programs modeling a class of non-deterministic parameterized cache coher-
ence protocols [6]. We use an approach to functional modeling of non-deterministic computing systems,
first presented by these authors in [24, 25, 27]. The simple idea behind the approach is as follows. Given
a program modeling a deterministic computing system, whose behavior depends on and is controlled by
an input parameter value, let us call for an oracle producing the input value. Then the meta-system in-
cluding both the program and the external oracle becomes non-deterministic one. And vice versa, given a
non-deterministic system, one may be concerned about the behavior of the system only along one possi-
ble path of the system evaluation. In such a case, the path of interest may be given as an additional input
argument of the system, forcing the system to follow along the path. Dealing with unknown value of the
additional parameter one can study any possible evolution of the non-deterministic system, for example,
aiming at verifying some properties of the system.
Viability of such an approach to verification has been demonstrated in previous works using super-
compilation as a program transformation and analyzing technique [24, 25, 27, 26, 19], where it was
applied to safety verification of program models of parameterized protocols and Petri Nets models. Fur-
thermore, the functional program modeling and supercompilation have been used to specify and verify
cryptographic protocols, and in the case of insecure protocols a supercompiler was utilized in an inter-
active search for the attacks on the protocols [1, 32]. In these cases the supercompiler has been used for
specializing the corresponding program models, aiming at moving the safety properties of interest from
the semantics level of the models to simplest syntactic properties of the residual programs produced by
the supercompiler. Later this approach was extended by G.W. Hamilton for verifying a wider class of
temporal properties of reactive systems [13, 14].
Given a specializer transforming the program written in a language L and used for program model
verification, in order to mitigate the limitation of the specification language L , in this paper we study
potential abilities of the corresponding specialization method for verifying the models specified in an-
other language M , removing the intermediate interpretation overheads. We analyze the supercompi-
lation algorithms allowing us crucially to remove the interpretation layer and to verify indirectly the
safety properties. The corresponding experiments succeed in verifying some safety properties of the
series of parameterized cache coherence protocols specified, for example, in the imperative WHILE
language by N.D. Jones [16]. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate that our method is able to deal
with non-imperative interpreted programs, we consider the case when a modelling language M is a non-
imperative subset of the basic language L . On the other hand, that allows us to simplify the presentation.
In order to prove the properties of interest, some our program models used in the experiments required
one additional supercompilation step (i.e., the corresponding residual programs should be supercompiled
once again1).
The considered class of cache coherence protocols effectively forms a benchmark on which various
methods for parameterized verification have been tried [6, 25, 27]. In [25, 27] we have applied direct ver-
ification via supercompilation approach without intermediate interpretation. The corresponding models
may be very large and the automatic proofs of their safety properties may have very complicated struc-
1Note that the method presented in the papers [2, 4] mentioned above sometimes requires a number of iterations of the
specialization step and the number is unknown.
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tures. See, for example, the structure of the corresponding proof [26] produced by the supercompiler
SCP4 [28, 29, 31] for the functional program model of the parameterized Two Consumers - Two Pro-
ducers (2P/2C) protocol for multithreaded Java programs [42]. Taking that into account, the experiment
presented in this paper can also be considered as a partial verification of the intermediate interpreters
IntM(p,d) used in the experiments. That is to say, a verification of the interpreters with respect to the
subset of the input values of the argument p, being the program models of the cache coherence protocols.
A supercompiler is a program specilalizer based on the supercompilation technique. The program
examples given in this paper were specialized by the supercompiler SCP4 [28, 29, 31]. We present our
interpreter examples in a variant of a pseudocode for a functional program while real supercompilation
experiments with the programs were done in the strict functional programming language Refal [40]2,
[41] being both the object and implementation language of the supercompiler SCP4. One of advantages
of using supercompilation, instead of other forms of partial evaluation or CLP specialization, is the use
of Turchin’s relation 4.2 (see also [39, 29, 34]) defined on function-call stacks, where the function calls
are labeled by the times when they are generated by the unfold-fold loop. This relation is responsible for
accurate generalizing the stack structures of the unfolded program configurations. It is based on global
properties of the path in the corresponding unfolded tree rather than on the structures of two given con-
figurations in the path. Turchin’s relation both stops the loop unfolding the tree and provides an evidence
of how a given call-stack structure has to be generalized. Proposition 1 proven in this paper shows that
a composition of the Turchin and Higman-Kruskal relations may prevent generalization of two given
interpreter configurations encountered inside one big-step of the interpreter. Such a prevention from
generalization is crucial for optimal specialization of any interpreter with respect to a given program.
This paper assumes that the reader has basic knowledge of concepts of functional programming,
pattern matching, term rewriting systems, and program specialization.
The contributions of this paper are: (1) Developing a method aiming at uniform reasoning on proper-
ties of configurations’ sequences that are encountered in specializing an interpreter of a Turing complete
language. (2) In particular, we have proved the following statement. Consider specialization of the inter-
preter with respect to any interpreted program from an infinite program set that is large enough to specify
a series of parameterized cache coherence protocols, controlled by a composition of the Turchin 4.2 and
Higman-Kruskal 4.1 relations. Given a big-step of the interpreter to be processed by the unfold-fold loop,
we assume that no both generalization and folding actions were still done by this loop up to the moment
considered. Then any two non-transitive 4.3 big-step internal configurations C1,C2 are prevented from
both generalization and folding actions. (3) We show that supercompilation controlled by the composi-
tion of the relations above is able to verify some safety properties of the series of parameterized cache
coherence protocols via intermediate interpretation of their program models. Note that these program
specifications include both the function call and constructor application stacks, where the size of the first
one is uniformly bounded on the input parameter while the second one is not. Unlike VeriMAP [3] our
indirect verification method involves no post-specialization unfold-fold.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the syntax and semantics of a pseudocode
for a subset of the strict functional language Refal which will be used throughout this paper. We also
give the operational semantics of the subset, defining its “self-interpreter”. In Section 3 we outline our
approach for specifying non-deterministic systems by an example used through this paper. In Section
4 we shortly introduce an unfold-fold program transformation method known as Turchin’s supercompi-
2The reader is welcome to execute several sample Refal programs and even any program written by the user directly from
the electronic version of the Turchin book.
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lation that is used in our experiments presented in this paper. We describe the strategy controlling the
unfold-fold loop. The corresponding relation is a composition of Turchin’s relation and a variant of the
Higman-Kruskal relation. This composition plays a central role in verifying the safety properties of the
cache coherence protocols’ models via intermediate interpretation. In Section 5 we prove in a uniform
way a number of properties of a huge amount of the complicated configurations generated by special-
ization of the self-interpreter with respect to the given program modeling a cache coherence protocol.
The argumentations given in the section are applicable for the whole series of the protocols mentioned
in Section 6. Developing the method of such argumentations is the main aim of the paper and both
Proposition 1 and the proof of this proposition are the main results of the paper. The statement given in
Proposition 1 can be applied to a wide class of interpreters of Turing complete programming languages.
This statement is a theoretical basis to the following. Why the approach suggested in the paper does
succeed in verifying the safety properties of the series of the cache coherence protocols via intermediate
interpretation. Finally, in Section 6 we report on some other experimental results obtained by using the
approach, discuss the results presented in the paper, and compare our experiments with other ones done
by existing methods.
2 An Interpreter for a Fragment of the SCP4 Object Language
A first interpreter we consider is an interpreter of a subset L of the SCP4 object language, which we
aim to put in between the supercompiler SCP4 and programs modeling the cache coherence protocols to
be verified. We will refer to this interpreter as a “self-interpreter”.
In this section, we describe the syntax and semantics of a pseudocode for the subset of the strict func-
tional language Refal which will be used throughout this paper. We also give the operational semantics
(that is, the interpreter) of the subset.
2.1 Language
prog ::= def1 . . . defn Program
def ::= f ( ps1 )⇒ exp1; . . . ; f ( psn )⇒ expn; Function Definition
exp ::= v Variable
| term : exp Cons Application
| f ( exp1, ..., expn ) Function Application
| exp1 ++ exp2 Append Application
| [] Nil
term ::= s.name Symbol-Type Variable
| (exp) Constructor Application
| σ Symbol
ps ::= p1, ..., pn Patterns
p ::= v
| s.name : p
| (p1) : p2
| σ : p
| []
v ::= s.name | e.name Variable
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Programs in L are strict term rewriting systems based on pattern matching.
The rules in the programs are ordered from the top to the bottom to be matched. To be closer to
Refal we use two kinds of variables: s.variables range over symbols (i.e., characters and identifiers, for
example, ’a’ and True), while e.variables range over the whole set of the S-expressions.3 Given a rule
l ⇒ r, any variable of r should appear in l. Each function f has a fixed arity, i.e., the arities of all
left-hand sides of the rules of f and any expression f ( exp1, ..., expn ) must equal the arity of f . The
parenthesis constructor (•) is used without a name. Cons constructor is used in infix notation and may
be omitted. The patterns in a function definition are not exhaustive. If no left-hand side of the function
rules matches the values assigned to a call of the function, then executing the call is interrupted and its
value is undefined. In the sequel, the expression set is denoted by E; D and S stand for the data set, i.e.,
the patterns containing no variable, and the symbols set, respectively. The name set of the functions of
an arity n is denoted by Fn while F stands for
⋃∞
n=0Fn. Ve and Vs stand for the e- and s-variable sets,
respectively, and V denotes Ve ∪Vs. Let an expression exp be given. Ve(exp), Vs(exp), V (exp) denote
the corresponding variable sets of exp. µv(exp) denotes the multiplicity of v ∈ V in exp, i. e., the number
of all the occurrences of v in exp. exp is called passive if no function application occurs in exp otherwise
it is called an active expression. T stands for the term set, σ stands for a symbol. Given an expression
exp and a variable substitution θ , expθ stands for θ(exp).
2.2 Encoding
In our experiments considered in this paper the protocol program models have to be input values of the
interpreter argument with respect to which the interpreter is specialized. Thus the program model should
be encoded in the data set of the implementation language of the interpreter. The program models used
in this paper are written in a fragment of the language described in Section 2.1, where ++ constructor is
not allowed and only unary functions may appear.
Now we have to define the corresponding encoding function denoted by the underline, where the
function A groups the program rules belonging to the same function as it is shown in the second definition
line.
prog = ( A( prog ) ); Program
f {rules} defs = (f rules ) : defs; Function Definitions
rule; rules = ( rule ) : rules; Rules
f ( pattern ) ⇒ exp = ( pattern ) : ’=’ : ( exp ); Rule
term : exp = term : exp; Here term ::= (exp) | s.name | σ
(exp) = (’*’ exp ); f ( exp ) = (Call f exp ); Applications
e.name = (Var ’e’ name); s.name = (Var ’s’ name); Variables
[] = []; σ = σ ; Nil and Symbol
Note that any pattern is an expression.
Supercompiler SCP4 in its processing dealing with programs as input data uses this encoding func-
tion and utilizes its properties. The image of D under the encoding is a proper subset of D, i. e., D 6= D.
For example, (Var ’s’ name) /∈ D.
3This fragment of Refal is introduced for the sake of simplicity. The reader may think that the syntactic category exp of list
expressions and the parenthesis constructor are Lisp equivalents. Actually Refal does not include Cons constructor but, instead
of Cons, Append is used as an associative constructor. Thus the Refal data set is wider as compared with the Lisp data set: the
first one is the set of finite sequences of arbitrary trees, while the second one is the set of binary trees. See [40] for details.
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Int( (Call s.f e.d), e.P )⇒ Eval( EvalCall( s.f , e.d, e.P ), e.P );
Eval( (e.env) : (Call s.f e.q) : e.exp, e.P )
⇒ Eval( EvalCall( s.f , Eval( (e.env) : e.q, e.P ), e.P ), e.P )++Eval( (e.env) : e.exp, e.P );
Eval( (e.env) : (Var e.var) : e.exp, e.P )⇒ Subst( e.env, (Var e.var) )++Eval( (e.env) : e.exp, e.P );
Eval( (e.env) : (’*’ e.q) : e.exp, e.P )⇒ (’*’ Eval( (e.env) : e.q, e.P )) : Eval( (e.env) : e.exp, e.P );
Eval( (e.env) : s.x : e.exp, e.P )⇒ s.x : Eval( (e.env) : e.exp, e.P );
Eval( (e.env) : [], e.P )⇒ [];
EvalCall( s.f , e.d, (Prog s.n) )⇒ Matching( F, [], LookFor( s.f , Prog( s.n ) ), e.d );
Matching( F, e.old, ((e.p) :’=’ : (e.exp)) : e.def , e.d )
⇒Matching( Match( e.p, e.d, ([]) ), e.exp, e.def , e.d );
Matching( (e.env), e.exp, e.def , e.d )⇒ (e.env) : e.exp;
Match( (Var ’e’ s.n), e.d, (e.env) )⇒ PutVar( (Var ’e’ s.n) : e.d, (e.env) );
Match( (Var ’s’ s.n) : e.p, s.x : e.d, (e.env) )
⇒Match( e.p, e.d, PutVar( (Var ’s’ s.n) : s.x, (e.env) ) );
Match( (’*’ e.q) : e.p, (’*’ e.x) : e.d, (e.env) )
⇒Match( e.p, e.d, Match( e.q, e.x, (e.env) ) );
Match( s.x : e.p, s.x : e.d, (e.env) )⇒ Match( e.p, e.d, (e.env) );
Match( [], [], (e.env) )⇒ (e.env);
Match( e.p, e.d, e.fail )⇒ F;
PutVar( e.assign, (e.env) )⇒ CheckRepVar( PutV( (e.assign), e.env, [] ) );
PutV( ((Var s.t s.n) : e.val), ((Var s.t s.n) : e.pval) : e.env, e.penv )
⇒ (Eq( e.val, e.pval )) : ((Var s.t s.n) : e.pval) : e.env;
PutV( (e.assign), (e.passign) : e.env, e.penv )
⇒ PutV( (e.assign), e.env, (e.passign) : e.penv );
PutV( (e.assign), [], e.penv )⇒ (T) : (e.assign) : e.penv;
CheckRepVar( (T) : e.env )⇒ (e.env);
CheckRepVar( (F) : e.env )⇒ F;
Eq( s.x : e.xs, s.x : e.ys )⇒ Eq( e.xs, e.ys );
Eq( (’*’ e.x) : e.xs, (’*’ e.y) : e.ys )⇒ ContEq( Eq( e.x, e.y ), e.xs, e.ys );
Eq( [], [] )⇒ T;
Eq( e.xs, e.ys )⇒ F;
ContEq( F, e.xs, e.ys )⇒ F;
ContEq( T, e.xs, e.ys )⇒ Eq( e.xs, e.ys );
LookFor( s.f , (s.f : e.def ) : e.P )⇒ e.def ;
LookFor( s.f , (s.g : e.def ) : e.P )⇒ LookFor( s.f , e.P );
Subst( ((Var s.t s.n) : e.val) : e.env, (Var s.t s.n) )⇒ e.val;
Subst( (e.assign) : e.env, e.var )⇒ Subst( e.env, e.var );
Figure 1: Self-Interpreter
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2.3 The Interpreter
The self-interpreter used in the experiments is given in Figure 1.
The entry point is of the following form Int( (Call s.f e.d), e.P ). Here the first argument is the
application constructor of the main function to be executed. The second argument provides the name
of a program to be interpreted. The encoded source of the program will be returned by a function call
of Prog whenever it is asked by EvalCall. For example, interpretation of program model Synapse N+1
given in Section 3.1 starts with the following application Int( (Call Main d0), (Prog Synapse) ), where
d0 is an input data given to program Synapse. Due to the large size of the encoded programs we omit the
definition of function Prog.
EvalCall( (Call s.f e.d), e.P ) asks for the definition of function s.f , calling LookFor, and initiates
matching the data given by e.d against the patterns of the definition rules. In order to start this pattern
matching, it imitates a fail happening in matching the data against a previous nonexistent pattern.
Function Matching runs over the definition rules, testing the result of matching the input data (e.d)
against the current pattern considered. In the case if the result is F the function calls functionMatch, ask-
ing for matching the input data against the next rule pattern. The environment e.env is initialized by []
(see the third argument of the Match call). If the pattern matching succeeds then function Matching re-
turns (e.env) : e.exp, where expression e.exp is the right-hand side of the current rule and the environment
includes the variable assignments computed by the pattern matching.
Function Match is trying to match the input data given in its second argument, step by step, against
the pattern given in its first argument. It computes the environment containing the variable substitution
defined by the matching (see the first and second function rules). If a variable is encountered then
function PutVar calls PutV looking for an assignment to the same variable and, if such an assignment
exists, the function tests a possible coincidence of the new and old values assigned to the variable. The
third rule of function Match deals with the tree structure, calling this function twice.
Function Eval passes through an expression given in its second argument. The second Eval rule deals
with a variable and calls function Subst looking the environment for the variable value and replacing the
variable with its value.
We intend to specialize interpreter Int with respect to its second argument. The corresponding Refal
source code of the self-interpreter may be found in
http://refal.botik.ru/protocols/Self-Int-Refal.zip.
3 Specifying Cache Coherence Protocols
We show our method [25, 27] for specifying non-deterministic systems by an example used through
this paper. The Synapse N+1 protocol definition given below is borrowed from [5]. The parameterized
version of the protocol is considered and counting abstraction is used in the specification. The protocol
has to react to five external non-deterministic events by updating its states being three integer counters.
The initial value of counter invalid is parameterized (so it could be any positive integer), while the other
two counters are initialized by zero. The primed state names stand for the updated state values. The
empty updates mean that nothing happened.
(rh) dirty+ valid ≥ 1 → .
(rm) invalid ≥ 1 → dirty′ = 0,valid′ = valid+1, invalid′ = invalid+dirty−1 .
(wh1) dirty ≥ 1 → .
(wh2) valid ≥ 1 → valid′ = 0,dirty′ = 1, invalid′ = invalid+dirty+ valid−1 .
(wm) invalid ≥ 1 → valid′ = 0,dirty′ = 1, invalid′ = invalid+dirty+ valid−1 .
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Specification of Safety Properties Any state reached by the protocol should not satisfy any of the two
following properties: (1) invalid ≥ 0,dirty ≥ 1,valid ≥ 1 ; (2) invalid ≥ 0,dirty ≥ 2,valid ≥ 0 .
Main( (e.time) : (e.is) )⇒ Loop( (e.time) : (Invalid I e.is) : (Dirty ) : (Valid ) );
Loop( ([]) :(Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )
⇒ Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) );
Loop( (s.t : e.time) : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )
⇒ Loop( (e.time) : Event( s.t : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ) );
Event( rm : (Invalid I e.is) :(Dirty e.ds) :(Valid e.vs) )
⇒ (Invalid Append( (e.ds) : (e.is) )) : (Dirty ) :(Valid I e.vs);
Event( wh2 : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid I e.vs) )
⇒ (Invalid Append( (e.vs) : (Append( (e.ds) : (e.is) )) )) : (Dirty I) : (Valid );
Event( wm : (Invalid I e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )
⇒ (Invalid Append( (e.vs) : (Append( (e.ds) : (e.is) )) )) : (Dirty I) : (Valid );
Append( ([]) : (e.ys) )⇒ e.ys;
Append( (s.x : e.xs) :(e.ys) )⇒ s.x : Append( (e.xs) : (e.ys) );
Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty I e.ds) : (Valid I e.vs) )⇒ False;
Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty I I e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )⇒ False;
Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )⇒ True;
Figure 2: Model of the Synapse N+1 cache coherence protocol
3.1 Program Model of the Synapse N+1 Cache Coherence Protocol
Let us then specify a program model of our sample protocol. The Synapse N+1 program is given in Figure
2. The idea behind the program specifications modeling the reactive systems is given in Introduction
1 above. The finite stream of events is modeled by a time value. The time ticks are labeled by the
events. The counters’ values are specified in the unary notation. The unary addition is directly defined
by function Append, i.e., without referencing to the corresponding macros. Function Loop exhausts the
event stream, step by step, and calls for Test verifying the safety property required from the protocol.
Thus function Main is a predicate.
Note that given input values the partial predicate terminates since the event stream is finite. The
termination is normal, if the final protocol state asked by the input stream is reachable one, otherwise it
is abnormal.
4 On Supercompilation
In this paper we are interested in one particular approach in program transformation and specialization,
known as supercompilation4 . Supercompilation is a powerful semantics-based program transformation
4From supervised compilation.
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technique [36, 38] having a long history well back to the 1960-70s, when it was proposed by V. Turchin.
The main idea behind a supercompiler is to observe the behavior of a functional program p running on
a partially defined input with the aim to define a program, which would be equivalent to the original
one (on the domain of the latter), but having improved properties. Given a program and its parameter-
ized entry point, supercompilation is performed by an unfold-fold cycle unfolding this entry point. It
reduces the redundancy that could be present in the original program. It folds the tree into a finite graph
of states and transitions between possible parameterized configurations of the computing system. And,
finally, it analyses global properties of the graph and specializes this graph with respect to these proper-
ties (without additional unfolding steps).5 The resulting program definition is constructed solely based
on the meta-interpretation of the source program rather than by a (step-by-step) transformation of the
program. The result of supercompilation may be a specialized version of the original program, taking
into account the properties of partially known arguments, or just a re-formulated, and sometimes more
efficient, equivalent program (on the domain of the original).
Turchin’s ideas have been studied by a number of authors for a long time and have, to some extent,
been brought to the algorithmic and implementation stage [31]. From the very beginning the development
of supercompilation has been conducted mainly in the context of the programming language Refal [28,
29, 30, 40]. A number of model supercompilers for subsets of functional languages based on Lisp
data were implemented with the aim of formalizing some aspects of the supercompilation algorithms
[18, 20, 36]. The most advanced supercompiler for Refal is SCP4 [28, 29, 31].
The verification system VeriMAP [3] by DeE. Angelis et al. [2, 4] uses nontrivial properties of
integers recognized by both CLP built-in predicates and external SMT solvers. We, like the VeriMAP
authors, use a nontrivial property of the configurations. The property is the associativity of the built-in
append function ++ supported by the supercompiler SCP4 itself6, rather than by an external solver.
4.1 The Well-Quasi-Ordering on E
The following relation is a variant of the Higman-Kruskal relation and is a well-quasi-ordering [15, 21]
(see also [23]).
Definition 1 The homeomorphic embedding relation ∝ is the smallest transitive relation on E satisfying
the following properties, where f ∈ Fn, α ,β ,τ ,s, t, t1, . . . , tn ∈ E and α ,β ,τ ∈T .
∀x,y ∈ Ve. x ∝ y,∀u,v ∈ Vs. u ∝ v; Variables(4.1)
[] ∝ t, t ∝ t, t ∝ f ( t1, . . ., t, . . . , tn ), t ∝ (t), t ∝ α : t; Monotonicity(4.2)
if s ∝ t and α ∝ β , then (s) ∝ (t),α:s ∝ β : t;
if s ∝ t, then f ( t1, . . . , s, . . . , tn ) ∝ f ( t1, . . ., t, . . . , tn ).
Note that the definition takes into account function append, since its infix notation exp1 ++ exp2
stands for append( exp1, exp2 ). We use relation ∝ modulo associativity of ++ and the following
equalities term : exp1 = term ++ exp1, exp ++ []= exp and [] ++ exp= exp.
Corollary 1 If t1, . . . , tn−1 ∈ T and tn ∈ E, and given i1, . . . , i j such that 1≤ i1 < i2 < .. . < i j ≤ n, then
ti1 : . . . : ti j ∝ t1 : . . . : tn.
5See also Section 7.1 in Appendix.
6As well as by the real programming language in terms of which the experiments described in this paper were done.
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Corollary 2 For any f ∈ Fn, α ,β ,γ , t1, . . . , tn ∈ E ( monotonicity of relation 6∝ )
if α 6∝ β , then f ( t1, . . . , ti−1, α , ti+1, . . . , tn ) 6∝ f ( t1, . . . , ti−1, β , ti+1, . . . , tn ).(4.3)
Given an infinite sequence of expressions t1, . . . , tn, . . ., relation ∝ is relevant to approximation of
loops increasing the syntactical structures in the sequence; or in other words to looking for the regular
similar cases of mathematical induction on the structure of the expressions. That is to say the cases,
which allow us to refer one to another by a step of the induction.
An additional restriction separates the basic cases of the induction from the regular ones. The restric-
tion is: ∀σ .([]) 6∝ (σ)& ∀v ∈ Vs.([]) 6∝ (v).
We impose this restriction on the relation ∝ modulo the equalities above and denote the obtained
relation as 4. It is easy to see that such a restriction does not violate the quasi-ordering property. Note
that the restriction may be varied in the obvious way, but for our experiments its simplest case given
above is used to control generalization and has turned out to be sufficient. In the sequel, t1 ≺ t2 stands
for the following relation t1 4 t2 and t1 6= t2, which is transitive.
Definition 2 A parameterized configuration is a finite sequence of the form
let e.h = f1( exp11, . . . , exp1m ) in . . . let e.h = fk( expk1, . . . , expkj ) in expn+1, where expn+1 is
passive, for all i> 1 µe.h(fi( . . . )) = µe.h(expn+1) = 1, and µe.h(f1( . . . )) = 0; for all i and all j variable
e.h does not occur in any function application being a sub-expression of expij. In the sequel, we refer to
such a function application fi( . . . ) given explicitly in the configuration as an upper function application.
The configurations present the function application stacks, in which all constructors’ applications not
occurring in arguments of the upper function applications are moved to the rightmost expressions. Here
the append ++ is treated as a complex constructor7 , rather than a function. The rightmost expression is
the bottom of the stack. Since the value of e.h is reassigned in each let in the stack, for brevity sake, we
use the following presentation of the configurations:
f1( exp11, . . . , exp1m ), . . . , fk( expk1, . . . , expkj ), expn+1, where variable e.h is replaced with bullet
•. I.e., the bullet is just a placeholder. The last expression may be omitted if it equals •. An example
follows f ( a : e.xs ++ e.ys ), g( • ++ e.ys, (Var b c), [] ), f ( s.x : • ), s.x : • ++ t( s.x : e.zs ), • .
4.2 The Well-Disordering on Timed Configurations
Let a program to be specialized and a path starting at the root of the tree unfolded by the unfold-fold
loop widely used in program specialization be given. The vertices in the path are labeled by the program
parameterized configurations. These configurations form a sequence. Given a configuration from such a
sequence and a function application from the configuration, we label the application by the time when it
is generated by the unfold-fold loop. Such a labeled function application is said to be a timed application.
A configuration is said to be timed if all upper function applications in the configuration are timed. Note
that, given a timed configuration, all its timed applications have differing time-labels. Given two different
configurations C1,C2, if the unfold-fold loop copies an upper function application from C1 and uses this
copy inC2, thenC1,C2 share this timed application. In the sequel, a sequence of the timed configurations
generated by the unfold-fold loop is also called just a path.
In this section we define a binary relation ⊳ on the timed configurations in the path. The relation
is originated from V. F. Turchin [39] (see also [29, 33, 34]). It is not transitive8, but like the well-quasi-
ordering it satisfies the following crucial property used by supercompilation to stop the loop unfolding
the tree.
7I.e., we use nontrivial properties of configurations containing the append ++. See the remark made in the footnote on p. 5.
8See Section 7.3 in Appendix for an example of the non-transitivity.
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For any infinite path C1,C2, . . . , Cn, . . . there exist two timed configurations Ci,C j such that i < j
and Ci ⊳ C j (see [39, 34]). For this reason we call relation ⊳ a well-disordering relation. In the sequel,
the time-labels are denoted with subscripts.
Definition 3 Given a sequence of timed configurations C1, . . . Cn, . . .; Ci and C j are elements of the
sequence such that i < j and Ci ::= f
1
t1
( . . . ), . . . , f ktk( . . . ),exp1, C j ::= g
1
τ1
( . . . ), . . . , gmτm( . . . ),exp2,
where f sts and g
q
τq , 1≤ s≤ k and 1≤ q≤ m, stand for function names f
s, gq labeled with times ts and τq,
respectively, and exp1,exp2 are passive expressions.
If k≤m, δ =m−k and ∃l .(1< l ≤ k) such that ∀s .(0≤ s≤ k− l) f l+stl+s = g
δ+l+s
τδ+l+s
(i.e., f l+s = gδ+l+s
and tl+s = τδ+l+s hold), f
l−1
tl−1
6= gδ+l−1τδ+l−1 , and ∀s .(0< s< l) f
s
ts
≃ gsτs (i.e., f
s = gs), then Ci ⊳ C j.
We say that configurations Ci, C j are in Turchin’s relation Ci ⊳ C j. This longest coincided rest of the
configurations are said to be a context, while the parts equal one to another modulo their time-labels are
called prefixes of the corresponding configurations.
The idea behind this definition is as follows. The function applications in the context never took a
part in computing the configuration C j, in this segment of the path, while any function applications in the
prefix of Ci took a part in computing the configuration C j. Since the prefixes of Ci,C j coincide modulo
their time-labels, these prefixes approximate a loop in the program being specialized. The prefix of Ci
is the entry point in this loop, while the prefix of C j initiates the loop iterations. The common context
approximates computations after this loop. Note that Turchin’s relation does not impose any restriction
on the arguments of the function applications inCi,C j.
For example, consider the following two configurations C1 ::= f4(. . .), f3(. . .), g2(. . .), t1(. . .), •
and C2 ::= f10(. . .), f7(. . .), g5(. . .), . . . , t1(. . .), • , then C1 ⊳ C2 holds. Here the context is t1(. . .),
the prefix of C1 is f4(. . .), f3(. . .), g2(. . .), and the prefix of C2 is f10(. . .), f7(. . .), g5(. . .), where the
subscripts of the application names stand for the time-labels. See also Section 7.3 for a detailed example
regarding Turchin’s relation.
4.3 The Strategy Controlling the Unfolding Loop
Nowwe describe the main relation controlling the unfold-fold loop. That is to say, given a path starting at
the root of the unfolded tree, and two timed configurations C1,C2 in the path such that C1 was generated
before C2, this relation stops the loop unfolding the tree and calls the tools responsible for folding this
path. These tools, firstly, attempt to fold C2 by a previous configuration and, if that is impossible, then
attempt to generalize this configuration pair. The relation is a composition of relations ⊳ and 4. It is
denoted with ⊳ ◦4 and is a well-disordering (see [39, 34]).
Thus we are given two timed configurations C1,C2 from a path, such that C1 is generated before C2,
and C2 is the last configuration in the path. If relation C1 ⊳ C2 does not hold, then the unfold-fold loop
unfolds the current configuration C2 and goes on. In the case relation C1 ⊳ C2 holds, these configurations
are of the forms (see Section 4.2 for the notation used below):
C1 = f
1
t1
( . . . ), . . . , f l−1tl−1 ( . . . ), f
l
tl
( . . . ), . . . , f ktk( . . . ),exp1,
C2 = f
1
τ1
( . . . ), . . . , f l−1τl−1 ( . . . ),g
l
τl
( . . . ), . . . , gmτm( . . . ), f
l
tl
( . . . ), . . . , f ktk( . . . ),exp2, where the context
starts at f ltl ( . . . ). LetC
p
i stand for the prefix ofCi, and C
c
i stand for the context ofCi followed by expi.
Now we compare the prefixes as follows. If there exists i (1 ≤ i < l) such that f iti( . . . ) 4 f
i
τi
( . . . )
does not hold, then C2 is unfolded and the unfold-fold loop goes on. Else, the sub-tree rooted in C1 is
removed and the specialization task defined by the C1 is decomposed into the two specialization tasks
corresponding to C
p
1 and C
c
1. Further the usual attempts to fold C
p
2 by C
p
1 and C
c
2 by C
c
1, respectively,
do work. If some of these attempts fail, then the corresponding configurations are generalized. Note
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that the context may be generalized despite the fact that it does not take a part in computing the current
configuration C2, since a narrowing of the context parameters may have happened.
A parameterized program configuration is said to be a transitive configuration if one-step unfolding
of the configuration results in a tree containing only the vertices with at most one outgoing edge. That
is to say, any of the tree vertices is not a branching vertex. For example, any function application of the
form f (d1, . . . ,dn), where any di ∈D, is transitive.
For the sake of simplicity, in the experiments described in this paper, the following strategy is used.
The unfold-fold loop skips all transitive configurations encountered and removes them from the tree
being unfolded. In the sequel, we refer to the strategy described in this section, including relation ⊳ ◦4,
as the ⊳ ◦4-strategy.
5 Indirect Verifying the Synapse N+1 ProgramModel
In this section we present an application of our program verification method based on supercompilation of
intermediate interpretations. In general the method may perform a number of program specializations9 ,
but all the cache coherence protocol program models that we have tried to verify by supercompiler SCP4
require at most two specializations.
Given a program partial predicate modeling both a cache coherence protocol and a safety property
required from the protocol, we use supercompilation aiming at moving the property hidden in the pro-
gram semantics to a simple syntactic property of the residual program generated by supercompilation,
i.e., this syntactic property should be easily recognized. In the experiments discussed in this paper we
hope the corresponding residual programs will include no operator return False;. Since the original di-
rect program model terminates on any input data (see Section 3.1), this property means that the residual
predicate never returns False and always True. Thus we conclude the original program model satisfies the
given safety property. In the terms of functional language L presented in Section 2.1 the corresponding
syntactic property is “No rule’s right-hand side contains identifier False”.10
We can now turn to the program modeling the Synapse N+1 protocol given in Section 3.1. In order
to show that the Synapse program model is safe, below we specialize the self-interpreter Int (see Section
2.3) with respect to the Synapse program model rather than the program model itself. Since program
Synapse terminates, the self-interpreter terminates when it interprets any call of the Main entry function
of Synapse. Since Synapse is a partial predicate, the calls of the forms Int((Call Main e.d), (Prog Synapse)),
where e.d takes any data, define the same partial predicate. Hence, the self-interpreter restricted to
such calls is just another program model of protocol Synapse N+1. This indirect program model is
much more complicated as compared with the direct model. We intend now to show that supercompiler
SCP4 [28, 29, 31] is able to verify this model. Thus our experiments show potential capabilities of
the method for verifying the safety properties of the functional programs modeling some complex non-
deterministic parameterized systems. In particular, the experiments can also be considered as a partial
verification of the intermediate interpreter used. In other words, verifying the interpreter with respect
to a set of the interpreted programs that specify the cache coherence protocols. This specialization
by supercompilation is performed by following the usual unfold-fold cycle controlled by the ⊳ ◦ 4-
strategy described in Section 4.3. Note that this program specification includes both the function call and
9I. e., the iterated ordinary supercompilation, which does not use any intermediate interpretation, of the residual program
produced by one indirect verification.
10Actually False is never encountered at all in any residual program generated by repeated launching the supercompiler SCP4
verifying the cache coherence protocol models considered in this paper. I.e., the property is simpler than the formulated one.
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constructor application stacks, where the size of the first one is uniformly bounded on the input parameter
while the second one is not.
We start off by unfolding the initial configuration Int( (Call Main e.d), (Prog Synapse) ), where the
value of e.d is unknown. The safety property will be proved if supercompilation is able to recognize all
rules of the interpreted program model, containing the False identifier, as being unreachable from this
initial configuration.
In our early work [27] we have given a formal model of the verification procedure above by super-
compilation. Let a program model and its safety property be given as described above, i.e., a partial
program predicate. Given an initial parameterized configuration of the partial predicate, it has been
shown that the unfold-fold cycle may be seen as a series of proof attempts by structure induction over the
program configurations encountered during supercompilation aiming at verification of the safety prop-
erty. Here the initial configuration specifies the statement that we have to prove. There are too many
program configurations generated by the unfold-fold cycle starting with the initial configuration given
above and the self-interpreter configurations are very large. As a consequence it is not possible to con-
sider all the configurations in details. We study the configurations’ properties being relevant to the proof
attempts and the method for reasoning on such properties.
5.1 On Meta-Reasoning
Let a program P0 written in L and a function application f (d0), where d0 ∈D is its input data, be given.
Let pi0 stand for expression (Prog NP0), where NP0 is the program name.
The unfolding loop standing alone produces a computation path C0,C1, . . . ,Cn, . . . starting off f (d0).
If f (d0) terminates then the path is finite C0,C1, . . . ,Ck. In such a case, for any 0 ≤ i < k Ci is a config-
uration not containing parameters, while Ck is either a passive expression, if partial function f defined
on the given input data, or the abnormal termination sign ⊥ otherwise. If the application does not termi-
nate then all Ci are non-parameterized configurations. The unfolding iterates function step(·) such that
step(Ci) =Ci+1.
Now let us consider the following non-parameterized configuration K0 = Eval(([]) : f ( d0 ),pi0) of
the self-interpreter. If f (d0) terminates then the loop unfolding the configuration K0 results in the encoded
passive configuration produced by the loop unfolding f (d0).
K1 = step(K0) = Eval( EvalCall( f , Eval( ([]) : d0, pi0 ), pi0 ), pi0 ) ++ Eval( ([]) : [], pi0 )
Expression K1 is not a configuration. According to the strategy described in Section 2.3 the unfolding
has to decompose expression K1 in a sequence of configurations connected by the let-variables. This
decomposition results in{
Eval( ([]) : d0, pi0 ), EvalCall( f , • , pi0 ), Eval( • , pi0 ), •
}
,
let e.x = • in { Eval( ([]) : [], pi0 ), e.x ++ • }, where e.x is a fresh parameter.
Hence, considering modulo the arguments, the following holds. Given a function-call stack element
f , this step maps the interpreted stack element to this segment of the interpreting function-call stack
represented by the first configuration above, when this stack segment will be computed then its result is
declared as a value of parameter e.x and the last configuration will be unfolded. Note that (1) these two
configurations split by the let-construct will be unfolded completely separately one from the other, i.e.,
the first configuration becomes the input of the unfolding loop, while the second configuration is post-
poned for a future unfolding call; (2) built-in function append ++ is not inserted in the stack at all, since
it is treated by the supercompiler as a kind of a special constructor, which properties are known by the
supercompiler handling this special constructor on the fly. The steps’ sequence step(Ki), . . . , step(K j−1)
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between two consecutive applications step(Ki), step(K j) of the first Eval rewriting rule unfolds the big-
step of the interpreter, interpreting the regular step corresponding to the application of a rewriting rule of
the f definition interpreted.
Given an expression exp to be interpreted by the interpreter, exp defines the current state of the P0
function-call stack. LetC be the configuration representing this stack state (see Section 2.3). Let f (exp1)
be the function application on the top of the stack. Then the current step step(Ki) corresponding to the
application of the first Eval rewriting rule maps f to the stack segment Eval1, EvalCall2, Eval3 of the
interpreter, considering modulo their arguments, and this stack segment becomes the leading segment of
the interpreting function-call stack. The remainder of the interpreted stack is encoded in the arguments
of Eval3, Eval4.
This remark allows us to follow the development of these two stacks in parallel. Given the following
two parameterized configurations f (exp1) and Eval((expenv) : f ( exp1 ),pi0)we are going to unfold these
configurations in parallel, step by step. The simpler logic of unfolding f (exp1) will provide hints on the
logic unfolding Eval((expenv) : f ( exp1 ),pi0).
Now we consider the set of the configuration pairs that may be generated by the unfold-fold loop and
are in the relation ⊳ ◦4.
5.2 Internal Properties of the Interpreter Big-Step
In this section we consider several properties of the configurations generated by the unfold-fold loop
inside one big-step of the self-interpreter.
Thus in order to prove indirectly that the program model is safe, we start off by unfolding the follow-
ing initial configuration Int( (Call Main e.d), (Prog Synapse) ), where the value of e.d is unknown. Let
pis stand for (Prog Synapse).
Consider any parameterized configurationCb generated by the unfold-fold loop and initializing a big-
step of the interpreter. Firstly, we assume thatCb is not generalized and no configuration was generalized
by this loop before Cb. In such a case, Cb is of the following form
Eval( (env) : arg, pis ), EvalCall( f , • , pis ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
where arg stands for the formal syntactic argument taken from the right-hand side of a rewriting rule
where f ( arg ) originates from, env ::= ( var : val ) : env | [], var ::= s.n | e.n, and val stands for a
partial known value of variable var. Since application f ( arg ) is on the top of the stack, argument arg
includes no function application. As a consequence, the leading Eval application has only to look for
variables and to call substitution Subst if a variable is encountered.
Thus, excluding all the transitive configurations encountered before the substitution, we consider the
following configuration{
Subst( env, (Var vart.n) ), •
}
, let e.x1 = • in
{ {
Eval( (env) : arg1, pis ), •
}
,
let e.x2 = • in
{
EvalCall( f , e.x1 ++ e.x2, pis ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
} }
where e.x1, e.x2 are fresh parameters, arg1 stands for a part of arg above to be processed, and vart.n
denotes the type and the name of the variable encountered.
We turn now to the first configuration to be unfolded. All configurations unfolded, step by step, from
the first configuration are transitive since Subst tests only types and names of the environment variables.
Function Subst is tail-recursive and returns value val asked for.
We skip transforming these transitive configurations and continue with the next one.{
Eval( (env) : arg1, pis ), •
}
, let e.x2 = • in
{
EvalCall( f , val ++ e.x2, pis ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
}
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By our assumption above, the loop unfolding this first configuration never generates a function applica-
tion. So the leading configuration proceeds to look for the variables in the same way shown above.
When arg is entirely processed and all variables occurring in arg are replaced with their partially
known values from the environment, then the current configuration looks as follows.
EvalCall( f , arg2, pis ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
Here expression arg2 is argθ , were θ is the substitution defined by environment env. I. e., arg2 may
include parameters standing for unknown data, while arg does not.
Function EvalCall is defined by the only rewriting rule. So, any application of this function is one-
step transitive. Recalling pis, we turn to the next configuration.
Prog( Synapse ), LookFor( f , • ), Matching( F, [], • , arg2 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
Prog( Synapse ) returns the source code of the interpreted program Synapse, while the LookFor
application returns the definition of the function called by the interpreter, using the known name f .
Skipping the corresponding transitive configurations, we have:
Matching( F, [], ((p1 ) :’=’ : (exp1 )) : defr1 , arg2 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
Here the third Matching argument is the f definition, where p1, exp1, defr1 stand for the pattern, the
right-hand side of the first rewriting rule of the definition, and the rest of this definition, respectively.
This Matching application transitively initiates matching the parameterized data arg2 against pattern p1
and calls another Matching application in the context of this pattern matching. This second Matching
application is provided with the f definition rest and arg2 for the case this pattern matching will fail. The
next configuration is as follows.
Match( p1 , arg2, ([]) ), Matching( •, exp1, defr1 , arg2 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .(X)
Remark 1 By now all the configurations generated by the unfolding loop were transitive. The steps pro-
cessing syntactic structure of the function application considered might meet constructor applications.
These constructor applications are accumulated in the second EvalCall argument. The analysis above
did not use any particular property of the interpreted program despite the fact that the source code of the
interpreted program has been received and processed.
Now we start to deal with function Match playing the main role in our analysis. In order to unfold
this configuration, we have now to use some particular properties of the interpreted program.
Since for any pattern p1 in program Synapse and any v ∈ V µv(p1) < 2 holds, Proposition 1 below
implies that the unfold-fold loop never stops unfolding the configuration X until the Match application
on the top of the stack will be completely unfolded to several passive expressions, step by step. These
expressions will appear on different possible computation paths starting at the configuration above. Skip-
ping the steps unfolding the tree rooted in this stack-top configuration, we turn to the configurations that
appear on the leaves of this tree. Each path starting at the top configuration leads to a configuration of
one of the following two forms. These configurations are transitive.
Matching( (env1), exp1, defr1 , arg3 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
Matching( F, exp1, defr1 , arg3 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
In the first case, the pattern matching did succeed and functionMatching replaces the current function
application with the right-hand side of the chosen rewriting rule, provided with the constructed environ-
ment. The big-step being considered has been finished. In order to launch the next big-step, interpreter
Int has now to update the top of the interpreting function application stack.
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In the second case, the pattern matching fails and function Matching once again calls Match, aiming
to match the parameterized data against the pattern of the next rewriting rule of function f . The next
configuration is of the form X above, in which the third Matching argument value is decremented with
the rewriting rule has been considered. If this value is empty and cannot be decremented, then, accord-
ing to the language L semantics 2.1, we have the abnormal deadlock state and the interpreter work is
interrupted.
Starting off from this configuration, the unfold-fold loop proceeds in the way shown above.
Proposition 1 For any pattern p0 such that for any v ∈ V µv(p0) < 2 and any parameterized passive
expression d, the unfold-fold loop, starting off from configuration Match( p0 , d, ([]) ) and controlled
by the ⊳ ◦4-strategy, results in a tree program11 such that any non-transitive vertex in the tree is labeled
by a configuration of the form Match( pi , di, (envi) ), . . . . Given a path in the tree and any two
configurations of the forms Match( pi , di, (envi) ), . . . and Match( pj , dj, (envj) ), . . . belonging to
the path, such that the second configuration is a descendant of the first one, then pj ≺ pi holds.
Proof If all descendants of configuration Match( p0 , d, ([]) ) are transitive then the unfold-fold loop
results in a tree being a root and this tree satisfies the property required. Now consider non-transitive
descendants of Match( p0 , d, ([]) ) that may be generated by the unfold-fold loop before the first
generalization or folding action happened. The patterns of the PutV rewriting rules never test unknown
data, hence any application of PutV is transitive. Since for any v ∈ V relation µv(p0) < 2 holds, then
function Eq will be never applied and the application of CheckRepVar is transitive. As a consequence,
all the non-transitive descendants are of the forms Match( pi , di, (envi) ), . . . .
Note that only the paths originated by applications of the 2-nd, 3-rd, 4-th Match rewriting rules may
contain configurations of such forms.
Consider a configuration Match( pi , di, (envi) ), . . . . Below Mi denotes such a configuration.
Since pi is a constant, hence one-step unfolding this configuration by the 2-nd rewriting rule leads
to configuration PutVar( s.n : ds, (envi) ), Match( pi+1 , di+1, • ), . . . such that pi+1 is a proper piece of
pi, in which at least one constructor is removed. Hence, pi+1 ≺ pi holds. Since the PutVar application is
transitive, a number of unfolding steps lead transitively to Match( pi+1 , di+1, (envi+1) ), . . . such that
pi+1 ≺ pi.
One-step unfolding the configuration Match( pi , di, (envi) ), . . . by the 3-rd rewriting rule leads to
configuration Match( pi+1 , di+1, (envi) ), Match( pi+2 , di+2, • ), . . . such that pi+1 and pi+2 are proper
pieces of constant pi. Hence, pi+1 ≺ pi and pi+2 ≺ pi hold.
One-step unfolding the configuration Match( pi , di, (envi) ), . . . by the 4-th rewriting rule leads to
configuration Match( pi+1 , di+1, (envi) ), . . . such that pi+1 is a proper piece of pi, in which at least one
constructor is removed. Hence, pi+1 ≺ pi holds.
Now consider any two configurations of the forms Match( pi , di, (envi) ), . . . and
Match( pj , dj, (envj) ), . . . such that the second configuration belongs to a path originating from the first
one and is encountered before any generalization. Hence, pi and pj are constants.
Given a configuration C, the length of C, denoted by lnc(C), is the number of the upper function
applications in C. (See Definition 2 above.)
If lnc(M j) < lnc(Mi) then Mi ⋪ M j and the Turchin relation prevents M j,Mi from generalization
and M j from any folding action. (See Section 4.3.)
11I.e., without any function application, excepting an entry point of this residual program.
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If lnc(M j) ≥ lnc(Mi) then we consider the first shortest configuration Mk in the path segment being
considered. By definition of the stack, Match( pk , dk, • ) is from Mi and Match( pj , dj, (envj) ) is a
descendent of Match( pk , dk, (envk) ).
Since Match( pk , dk, • ) took a part in computing M j, it is the last function application of the
stack prefix defined by the following Turchin relation Mi ⊳ M j, which holds. On the other hand, by
the reasoning given above, for any p jl from the prefix of M j, defined by this Turchin relation, p jl ≺ pk
holds, and, as a consequence, the following relation Match( pjl , djl , (envjl ) ) ≺ Match( pk , dk, • )
holds. According to Turchin’s relation, this relation prevents M j,Mi from generalization and M j from
any folding action. (See Section 4.3.)
The proposition has been proven. 
5.3 Dealing with the Interpreter Function-Application Stack
Firstly, assuming again that no generalization happened in the unfold-fold loop up to now, given a right-
hand side exp0 of a rewriting rule returned by functionMatching as described in Section 5.2, the following
configuration has to map, step by step, the segment of the interpreted function-application stack, that is
defined by known exp0, on the top of the interpreting stack.
Eval( (env) : exp0 , pis ), . . .
According to the call-by-value semantics, function Eval looks for the function application, whose
right bracket is the leftmost closing bracket, in completely known exp0. It moves from left to right along
exp0, substitutes transitively the variables encountered, as shown in Section 5.2, pushes the interpreted
function application in the interpreting stack, mapping it into an EvalCall application, whenever the
interpreted application should be pushed in the interpreted stack. See Section 5.1 for the details. Finally
the depth first EvalCall application starts the next big-step.
Since for any pattern p of program Synapse and any v∈ V µv(p)< 2 holds, hence, all applications of
Eq, ContEq and PutV are transitive. This note together with Proposition 1 implies Proposition 2 below.
Let pi stand for sub-patterns of a pattern of program Synapse, argi and def stand for partially known
parameterized expressions and several, maybe zero, rewriting rules being a rest of a function definition
of Synapse, respectively. Let exp stand for the right-hand side of a rewriting rule from this definition.
env ::= ( var : val ) : env | [], var ::= s.n | e.n , and val stands for a partially known value of variable
var. Let Int0 denote Int( (Call Main e.d), pis ), where the value of e.d is unknown.
Proposition 2 Let the unfold-fold loop be controlled by the ⊳ ◦4-strategy. Let it start off from the initial
configuration Int0. Then the first generalized configuration generated by this loop, if any, will generalize
two configurations of the following forms and any configuration folded, before this generalization, by a
previous configuration is of the following form, where n> 0,
Match( p1 , arg1, (env) ), . . . , Match( pn , argn, • ), Matching( •, exp, def , arg0 ),(¶)
Eval( • , pis ), . . .
Now consider any application of the form Match( p1 , arg1, (env) ) staying on the stack top. Let
Match1 denote this application. Only the third rewriting rule of Match increases the stack. In this case
the next state after the stack ¶ is of the form Match3, Match2 . . .. Then, by Proposition 1, along any
path originating from Match2 the application Match2 is not replaced until application Match3 will be
completely unfolded. Hence, for any stack state of the form fi, . . . , Match2, . . . on such a path, where fi
denotes any function application, the following relation Match2, . . . ⋪ fi, . . . , Match2, . . . holds. That
proves the following corollary using the denotations given above.
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Corollary 3 Given a timed application Matchingt0 ( •, exp, def , arg0 ), any two timed configurations of
the form . . . , Matchingt0 ( •, exp, def , arg0 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . . can neither be generalized nor folded
one by the other.
Since any application Matching( . . ., exp, def , ) decreases, step by step, the list def of the rewriting
rules, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 4 Given a big-step of Int, a timed pair expt1 , deft1
12, and a timed application
Matchingτ0 ( •, expt1 , deft1 , arg0 ) inside this big-step, then any two timed configurations of the form
. . . , Matchingτi ( •, expti , defti , arg0 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . . can neither be generalized nor folded one by
the other.
Given a function definition F and a rewriting rule r of the definition, let expF,r stand for the right-
hand side of r, while defF,r stand for the rest of this definition rules following the rule r. The following
is a simple syntactic property of the Synapse program model given in Section 3.
For any F1,F2 ∈ {Main,Loop,Event,Append,Test} and for any two distinct rewriting rules r1,r2(5.1)
of F1,F2, respectively,(expF1,r1 ,defF1,r1) 6= (expF2,r2 ,defF2,r2) holds.
That together with Corollaries 3, 4 imply:
Proposition 3 Given two configurations C1 and C2 of the form ¶ to be generalized or folded one by
the other. Then (1) C1 and C2 cannot belong to the same big-step of Int; (2) there are two functions
F1, F2 of a cache coherence protocol model from the series mentioned in Section 6 (and specified in the
way shown in Section 3) and rewriting rules r1,r2 of F1,F2, respectively, such that (expF1 ,r1 ,defF1,r1) =
(expF2 ,r2 ,defF2,r2), where functions F1, F2 and rules r1,r2 may coincide, respectively.
Remark 2 Proposition 3 depends on Property 5.1. Nevertheless, the restriction imposed by 5.1 is very
weak and the most of programs written in L satisfy 5.1. It can easily be overcome by providing the
interpreting function Matching with an additional argument that is the interpreted function name. The
second statement of this proposition is well and crucial for the expectation of removing the interpretation
overheads. Despite the fact that the reasoning above follows the Synapse program model, it can be
applied to any protocol model used in our experiments described in this paper.
We conclude that any configuration encountered by the loop unfolding the given big-step is neither
generalized with another configuration generated in unfolding this big-step nor folded by such a config-
uration.
5.4 On Generalizing the Interpreter Configurations
The unfold-fold loop processes the paths originating from the initial configuration Int0, following the
corresponding interpreted paths. The latter ones are processed according to the order of the rewriting
rules in the Synapse function definitions.
The initial configuration Int0 is unfolded according to function definition of Main of the interpreted
program. Application of this function leads transitively to the following function application
Loop( (time) : (Invalid I is) : (Dirty ) : (Valid ) )
12Here we use the denotation given above and the timed expressions, which are defined in the same way as the timed
applications 4.2.
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The interpreter has to match this call against the left-hand side of the first rewriting rule of the Loop
definition. The first corresponding pattern is: ([]) : (Invalid e.is) :(Dirty e.ds) :(Valid e.vs).
The pattern matching processes the pattern and argument from the left to the right, by means of
function Match. The known part of the tree structure is mapped into the interpreting stack by the third
rule of Match. The number of Match applications in the stack is increased by this rewriting rule.
In the given context of specialization the values of time and is are unknown. Hence, the prefix of this
stack that is responsible for matching the argument constant structure on the left-hand side of time will
transitively disappear and the unfolding loop will stop at the configuration of the following form
Match( [], time, ([]) ), Match( p2 , arg2, • ), Matching( •, exp, def , arg0 ), Eval( • , pis ), •.
Here the leading Match application meets the unknown data time and has to match it against [] given in
the first argument. The environment in the third argument is empty since no variable was still assigned
up to now. The second Match application is responsible for matching the suspended part of the input
data arg2 against the rest p2 of the pattern. I. e., arg2 equals (Invalid I is) : (Dirty ) :(Valid ) and p2 equals
(Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs).
Now we note that the arguments of all applications of the recursive Loop and Append functions have
exactly the same constant prefix as considered above. That leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let the unfold-fold loop be controlled by the ⊳ ◦4-strategy. Let it start off from the initial
configuration Int0. Then the first generalized configuration generated by this loop, if any, will generalize
two configurations of the following forms and any configuration folded, before this generalization, by a
previous configuration is of the following form
Match( [], arg1, ([]) ), Match( p2 , arg2, • ), Matching( •, exp, def , arg0 ), Eval( • , pis ), . . .
In the given context of specialization the Turchin relation plays a crucial role in preventing the en-
countered configurations from generalization (see Proposition 1). It never forces decomposing the gen-
eralized configurations as might do, in general (see Section 4.2).
The first generalization has happened on the path unfolding the interpreted Loop along the recursive
branch following the iteration of the protocol event rm. No configuration was folded before this gen-
eralization. Only the number of Valid items taking a part in the Synapse protocol was generalized. It
serves as an accumulator and occurs twice in the generalized configuration Cg1 . So this generalization
does not violate the safety property. Actually, this parameter might be introduced still in the initial con-
figuration Int0 and the corresponding initial configuration generalized in advance may be seen as a more
meaningful formulation of the verification task.
No other generalization of the configurations generated by the recursion defined in function Loop has
happened.
The first folding action was done in the same context as the first generalization done. The only dis-
tinction consists in another action: a generated configuration was folded by Cg1 . Thus there is the only
variable to be nontrivially substituted by this folding. The variable is the accumulating parameter intro-
duced by this generalization.
The second folding action was performed by the generalized configuration Cg1 itself. The folded
configuration ends a branch following the iteration of the protocol event rm. There are two variables to
be nontrivially substituted by this folding. One of the variables is the accumulating parameter mentioned
above, while the other one is substituted with constant [].
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The third folding action was done by a regular configuration C1. Configuration C1 is a descendant of
Cg1 . The folded configuration ends a branch following the iteration of the protocol event wm. The cor-
responding substitution is completely trivial, i. e., the folded and folding configurations coincide modulo
variables names.
The sub-tree rooted in C1 is completely folded. Configuration C1 is declared as an entry point of a
residual function definition. The fist rewriting rule of this definition is an exit from a recursion returning
the value True, while the second and third branches refer toCg1 and C1, respectively.
The second generalization is forced by the interpreted Append that is directly defined. It has happened
along the recursive branch following the iteration of the protocol event wh2. The generalized configu-
rations include several suspended substitutions to be performed in completely known expressions. Thus
these substitutions may be done before this generalization if one might reveal formal reasons for such
treatment of the suspended substitutions. These suspended substitutions form a stack of the Eval appli-
cations aiming at executing them. This stack is still presented with delayed syntax composition, i. e., the
Eval applications are not still pushed in the explicit function application stack of the corresponding con-
figuration. The Eval application stack was generalized. A part of its calls were completely generalized
by a parameter generalizing a rest of this stack, while the other calls were partially generalized. This sec-
ond part of the generalization is very bad. The corresponding generalizing substitution contains pieces
of the interpreted program model. The pieces are names and types of several variables. Fortunately, this
generalization does not violate the safety property to be verified. Neither Dirty nor Valid counters were
generalized by this generalization. Below Cg2 stands for the configuration constructed by the second
generalization.
The fourth folded configuration is a descendent of configuration Cg2 . It was folded by the regular
configuration C1 used in the third folding. The corresponding substitution is quite trivial. There are two
parameters in both the folded and folding configurations. The folding substitution renames the parameter
corresponding to the initial unknown data e.time and replaces the parameter, standing for the unknown
value of the Invalid counter, with concatenation of completely unknown data early split into three parts.
The fifth folded configuration is a descendent of configuration Cg2 and it is folded by Cg2 as well.
There are thirteen parameters occurring inCg2 . Fife parameters are substituted with expressions contain-
ing names and/or types of some variables from the Synapse program model. One parameter is replaced
with an expression including an application Eval that presents a generalized environment of this program
model.
The sub-tree rooted in Cg2 is completely folded. Configuration Cg2 is declared as an entry point of a
residual function definition. The fist rewriting rule of this definition refers to C1, while the seconds one
refers toCg2 , i. e., to itself.
The sixth folding action was done by the regular configurationC1 used above. The folding substitution
increases counter Invalid and renames the variable corresponding to stream e.time.
The third generalization is forced by the interpreted Append that is directly defined. It has happened
along the recursive branch following the iteration of the protocol event wm. The corresponding general-
ized configuration Cg3 has 14 parameters and the badness similar toCg2 .
The seventh folding action was done in a similar context as the fourth one done. The only distinction
consists in increasing the Invalid counter by a constant.
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The eighth folded configuration is a descendent of configuration Cg3 and it is folded by Cg3 as well.
The corresponding folding substitution has the badness similar to the fifth folding substitution.
The sub-tree rooted in Cg3 is completely folded. Configuration Cg3 is declared as an entry point of a
residual function definition. The fist rewriting rule of this definition refers to C1, while the seconds one
refers toCg3 , i. e., to itself.
That in its turn allows us to fold the sub-tree rooted in the first generalized configuration Cg1 . Con-
figuration Cg1 is declared as an entry point of a residual function definition. The fist rewriting rule of this
definition is an exit from a recursion returning the value True. The second rewriting rule calls this entry
point Cg1 , while the third and fourth branches refer toCg2 and Cg3 , respectively.
The last folded configuration belongs to the last branch originating from the initial configuration. It is
folded by the regular configuration C1, which belongs to a parallel path and was used in the third folding.
The entire specialized tree has been completely folded and the safety property has been proven. Note
that no generalized configuration was refused by the generalized configurations that were generated later
than the former one.
The crucial configurations of the unfolding history leading to verification of this program model are
given in Appendix 7.4 and are self-sufficient. The residual program, generated by supercompilation of
the residual program resulted in specializing the self-interpreter with respect to the Synapse N+1 program
model, is given in Section 7.2.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that a combination of the verification via supercompilation method and the second Fu-
tamura projection allows us to perform verification of the program being interpreted. We discussed the
crucial steps of the supercompliation process involved in a verification of a parameterized cache coher-
ence protocol used as a case study. In the same way we were able to verify all cache coherence protocols
from [6, 7], including MSI, MOSI, MESI, MOESI, Illinois University, Berkley RISC, DEC Firefly, IEEE
Futurebus+, Xerox PARCDragon, specified in the interpreted language L . Furthermore, we were able to
verify the same protocols specified in the language WHILE [16]. The complexity of involved processes
is huge and further research is required for their better understanding.
Our experimental results show that Turchin’s supercompilation is able to verify rather complicated
program models of non-deterministic parameterized computing systems. The corresponding models
used in our experiments are constructed on the base of the well known series of the cache coherence
protocols mentioned above. So they might be new challenges to be verified by program transformation
rather than an approach for verifying the protocols themselves. This protocol series was early verified by
Delzanno [6] and Esparza et al. [8] in abstract terms of equality and inequality constraints. Using unfold-
fold program transformation tools this protocol series was early verified by the supercompiler SCP4
[24, 25, 27, 26] in terms of a functional programming language, several of these protocols were verified
in terms of logical programming [35, 10]. One may consider the indirect protocol models presented in
this paper as a new collection of tests developing the state-of-the-art unfold-fold program transformation.
The intermediate interpreter considered in this paper specifies the operational semantics of a Turing-
complete language L . We have proved several statements on properties of the configurations generated
by the unfold-fold cycle in the process specializing Int with respect to the cache coherence protocols
specified as shown in Section 3. The main of them is Proposition 1. Some of these properties do not
depend on specific protocols from the considered series, i. e., they hold for any protocol specified in the
way shown in Section 3. That allows us to reason, in a uniform way, on huge amount of complicated
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configurations. Note that the programs specifying the protocols include both the function call and con-
structor application stacks, where the size of the first one is uniformly bounded on the input parameter
while the second one is not. Unlike system VeriMAP [3] our indirect verification method involves no
post-specialization unfold-fold.
As a future work, we would like to address the issue of the description of suitable properties of
interpreters to which our uniform reasonings demonstrated in this paper might be applied.
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Antonina Nepeivoda and several reviewers for helping
to improve this work.
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7 Appendix
7.1 General Structure of the Supercompiler SCP4
Input: (i) A list Tasks of parameterized entry configurations, (ii) a source program, and (iii) strategies
for performing the transformation.
Output: A set of residual function definitions.
residual := [] ; /* Initialization. */
do {
current-task := head( Tasks ) ;
unfolding ; /* This actions may add */
folding & generalization ; /* configurations to Tasks. */
if ( the current-task has been completely folded )
{ global-analysis ;
specialization with respect to the global properties ;
propagation of the global information over Tasks ;
if ( the current-task is not empty )
{ residual := residual ∪ {current-task}; }
Tasks := tail( Tasks ) ;
} ;
} while ( there is a configuration in Tasks )
dead-code-analysis ;
Figure 3: General Structure of the Supercompiler SCP4
7.2 Residual Program
The residual program, generated by supercompilation of the residual program resulted in specializing the
self-interpreter 1 with respect to the Synapse N+1 program model 2, is given in Figure 4, where, for sake
of readability, the variables’ names and the entry function name were renamed.
The following three residual functions F12, F31, F46 are specialized versions of the recursion de-
fined in function Loop, while the two residual functions F64 and F100 are reflection of the recursion
defined by function Append directly specified in the Synapse N+1 program.
Any right-hand side of the rewriting rules generated by the first supercompilation, which are not
shown here, includes no identifier False. Hence, the Synapse N+1 program model already was success-
fully verified by the first application of the supercompiler SCP4, but the corresponding residual models
includes syntactic pieces of the second rewiring rule of function Append. The second application of this
supercompiler removes these syntactic pieces.
See Section 7.4 for some details of the first supercompilation application.
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IntRes( (’*’) :(’*’ : e.is) )⇒ True;
IntRes( (’*’ : rm : e.time) : (’*’ : e.is) )⇒ F12( (e.time) : e.is );
IntRes( (’*’ : wm) :(’*’ :e.is) )⇒ True;
IntRes( (’*’ : wm : rm : e.time) : (’*’ : I : e.is) )⇒ F12( (e.time) : I : e.is );
IntRes( (’*’ : wm : wm : e.time) :(’*’ : I : e.is) )⇒ F46( (e.time) : e.is );
F12( ([]) :e.is2 )⇒ True;
F12( (rm : e.time) : I : e.is2 )⇒ F31( ([]) : (e.time) : e.is2 );
F12( (wh2) : e.is2 )⇒ True;
F12( (wh2 : rm : e.time) : I : e.is2 )⇒ F12( (e.time) : I : e.is2 );
F12( (wh2 : wm : e.time) : I : e.is2 )⇒ F46( (e.time) : e.is2 );
F12( (wm : e.time) : I : e.is2 )⇒ F46( (e.time) : e.is2 );
F31( (e.is3) : ([]) :e.is2 )⇒ True;
F31( (e.is3) : (rm : e.time) : I : e.is2 )⇒ F31( (I : e.is3) : (e.time) : e.is2 );
F31( (e.is3) : (wh2 : e.time) : e.is2 )⇒ F64( (e.is3) : (e.is2) :(e.time) );
F31( (e.is3) : (wm : e.time) : I : e.is2 )⇒ F100( (e.is3) : (e.is2) :(e.time) );
F46( ([]) :e.is2 )⇒ True;
F46( (rm : e.time) : e.is2 )⇒ F12( (e.time) : I : e.is2 );
F46( (wm : e.time) : e.is2 )⇒ F46( (e.time) : e.is2 );
F64( ([]) : (e.ys2) : (e.time) : e.ys3 )⇒ F46( (e.time) : e.ys3 ++ e.ys2 );
F64( (s.x1 : e.xs2) : (e.ys2) : (e.time) : e.ys3 )⇒ F64( (e.xs2) : (e.ys2) : (e.time) : e.ys3 ++ s.x1 );
F100( ([]) : (e.ys2) : (e.time) : e.ys3 )⇒ F46( (e.time) : I : e.ys3 ++ e.ys2 );
F100( (s.x1 : e.xs2) : (e.ys2) : (e.time) : e.ys3 )⇒ F100( (e.xs2) : (e.ys2) : (e.time) : e.ys3 ++ s.x1 );
Figure 4: Residual Model of the Synapse N+1 Cache Coherence Protocol
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7.3 Non-Transitivity of Turchin’s Relation
The following example shows that Turchin’s relation 4.2 is not transitive. The idea of the example is
borrowed from [33].
[R0] Main( e.xs )⇒ C( Fb( Fab( e.xs ) ) ); [R7] F( [] )⇒ [];
[R8] F( e.xs )⇒ Fc( Fab( e.xs ) );
[R1] Fab( [] )⇒ ’c’;
[R2] Fab( ’a’ :e.xs )⇒ ’b’ :Fab( e.xs ); [R9] Fb( [] )⇒ [];
[R3] Fab( e.xs )⇒ Fc( Fab( e.xs ) ); [R10] Fb( ’b’ : e.xs )⇒ ’b’ : e.xs;
[R11] Fb( s.y : e.xs )⇒ E( s.y : Fb( F( e.xs ) ) );
[R4] Fc( [] )⇒ [];
[R5] Fc( ’c’ :e.xs )⇒ ’d’ :’d’; . . . E( . . . )⇒ . . . ;
[R6] Fc( s.y : e.xs )⇒ s.y : Fc( e.xs ); . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . C( . . . )⇒ . . . ;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consider the path starting at initial configuration Main and following the sequence of the rewriting
rules [R0], [R3], [R1], [R5], [R11], [R8]:
[1]: Main0( e.xs )
R0−→ [2]: Fab3( e.xs ),Fb2( • ),C1( • )
R3−→ [3]: Fab5( e.xs ),Fc4( • ),Fb2( • ),C1( • )
R1−→ [4]: Fc4( ’c’ ),Fb2( • ),C1( • )
R5−→ [5]: Fb2( ’d’ :’d’ ),C1( • )
R11−→ [6]: F8( ’d’ ),Fb7( • ),E6( ’d’ : • ),C1( • )
R8−→ [7]: Fab10( ’d’ ),Fc9( • ),Fb7( • ),E6( ’d’ : • ),C1( • )
Here the pairs [2], [3] and [3], [7] of the timed configurations are in Turchin’s relation:
- [2] ⊳ [3] holds, where the common context is Fb2( • ),C1( • ) and the prefixes are Fab3( e.xs )
and Fab5( e.xs ), respectively;
- [3] ⊳ [7] hold, where the common context is C1( • ) and the prefixes are
Fab5( e.xs ),Fc4( • ),Fb2( • ) and Fab10( ’d’ ),Fc9( • ),Fb7( • ), respectively.
While [2] ⊳ [7] does not hold.
7.4 Generalized and Folded Configurations
7.4.1 Generalization
1. Gener-1: Loop. The first generalization has happened on the path unfolding the interpreted Loop
along the recursive branch following the iteration of the protocol event rm. No configuration
was folded before this generalization. The boxed pieces of the configurations below stand for
the generalized parts. Only the number of Valid items taking a part in the Synapse protocol was
generalized. It serves as an accumulator and occurs twice in the generalized configuration. So this
generalization does not violate the safety property.
The previous configuration:
Match( [], e.101, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is):(Dirty e.ds):(Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.102):(Dirty ):(Valid I [] ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ) ,
( Loop( (s.t : e.time) : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )
⇒ Loop( (e.time) :Event( s.t : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ) );
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), (e.101 ) : (Invalid e.102 ) : (Dirty ) : (Valid I [] )
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.101, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is):(Dirty e.ds):(Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.102):(Dirty ):(Valid I I ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ) ,
( Loop( (s.t : e.time) : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )
⇒ Loop( (e.time) :Event( s.t : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ) );
), (e.101 ) : (Invalid e.102 ) : (Dirty ) : (Valid I I )
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The generalized configuration:
Match( [], e.101, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is):(Dirty e.ds):(Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.102):(Dirty ):(Valid I e.138 ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ) ,
( Loop( (s.t : e.time) : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) )
⇒ Loop( (e.time) :Event( s.t : (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ) );
), (e.101 ) : (Invalid e.102 ) : (Dirty ) : (Valid I e.138 )
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
2. Gener-2: Append
The second generalization is forced by the interpreted Append that is directly defined. It has hap-
pened along the recursive branch following the iteration of the protocol event wh2. The generalized
configurations include several suspended substitutions to be performed in completely known ex-
pressions. Thus these substitutions may be done before this generalization if one might reveal
formal reasons for such treatment of the suspended substitutions. These suspended substitutions
form a stack of the Eval applications aiming at executing them. This stack is still presented with
delayed syntax composition, i. e., the Eval applications are not still pushed in the explicit function
application stack of the corresponding configuration. The Eval application stack was generalized.
A part of its calls were completely generalized by a parameter generalizing a rest of this stack,
while the other calls were partially generalized. This second part of the generalization is very bad.
The corresponding generalizing substitution contains pieces of the interpreted program model.
The pieces are names and types of several variables. Fortunately, this generalization does not vi-
olate the safety property to be verified. Neither Dirty nor Valid counters were generalized by this
generalization. Below Cg2 stands for the configuration constructed by the second generalization.
The cause leading to the bad generalization is a wrong choice of the sequence of the steps gen-
eralizing the two configurations. Since constructor ++ is associative some sub-expressions of
these configurations may be processed from both the left and right sides of the sub-expressions.
The supercompiler SCP4 makes a bad choice in the situation described above. There are simple
syntactic tricks allowing us overcome this problems. Nevertheless, the indirect specification of the
Synapse N+1 protocol can be verified without using the tricks.
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The previous configuration:
Match( [], e.138 , ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.137), • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.138 ) : ( e.137 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.136) : ( Invalid [] ++ • ++
Eval( (( e. vs : e.138 ) : ( e . is : e.137 ) : ( e. ds : [] )) : [], (Prog Synapse) )
++ []
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : e.138 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.138 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (s.t : wh2) : (e.time : e.136) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.138 , ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.137), • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.138 ) : (e.137 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.136) : ( Invalid s.195 • ++
Eval( (( e. ys : e.137) : ( s . x : s.195 ) : ( e. xs : e.138 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : s.195 : e.138) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : [], (Prog Synapse) )
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : s.195 : e.138 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : s.195 : e.138 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (s.t : wh2) : (e.time : e.136) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The generalized configuration:
Match( [], e.202 , ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.137), • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.202 ) : (e.137 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.136) : ( Invalid e.207 ++ • ++
Eval( (( e. s.208 : e.209 ) : ( s.210 . s.211 : e.212 ) : ( e. s.213 : e.214 )) : [],
(Prog Synapse) )
++ e.215
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : e.216 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.216 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (s.t : wh2) : (e.time : e.136) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
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(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
3. Gener-3: Append
The third generalization is forced by the interpreted Append that is directly defined. It has hap-
pened along the recursive branch following the iteration of the protocol event wm. The correspond-
ing generalized configuration Cg3 has 14 parameters and the badness similar to Cg2 .
The previous configuration:
Match( [], e.138 , ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.137), • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.138 ) : (e.137 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.136) : ( Invalid I [] ++ • ++
Eval( ((e.ys : e.137) : (s.x : I ) : (e.xs : e.138 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( (( e. vs : I : e.138 ) : ( e . is : e.137 ) : ( e. ds : [] )) : [], (Prog Synapse) )
++ []
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.138 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.138 ) : (e.is : I : e.137) : (s.t : wm) : (e.time : e.136) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.138 , ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.137), • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.138 ) : (e.137 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.136) : ( Invalid I s.240 • ++
Eval( ((e.ys : e.137) : (s.x : s.240 ) : (e.xs : e.138 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( (( e. ys : e.137 ) : ( s . x : I ) : ( e. xs : s.240 : e.138 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : s.240 : e.138) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : [], (Prog Synapse) )
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : I : s.240 : e.138 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : s.240 : e.138 ) : (e.is : I : e.137) : (s.t : wm) : (e.time : e.136) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
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The generalized configuration:
Match( [], e.250 , ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.137), • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.138 ) : (e.137 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.136) : ( Invalid I e.255 ++ • ++
Eval( ((e.ys : e.137) : (s.x : s.257 ) : (e.xs : e.250 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( (( e. s.259 : e.260 ) : ( s.261 . s.262 : e.137 ) : ( e. s.264 : e.265 )) : [],
(Prog Synapse) )
++ e.266
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.267 ) : (e.is : e.137) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.267 ) : (e.is : I : e.137) : (s.t : wm) : (e.time : e.136) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
7.4.2 Folding
In this subsection the boxed pieces of the current configurations stand for the parts to be substituted in the
corresponding previous configurations, while the double boxed variables of the previous configurations
are variables of the substitutions folding the current configurations. The trivial part of these substitutions
may be omitted.
1. Folding-1: The first folding action was done in the same context as the first generalization done.
The only distinction consists in another action: a generated configuration was folded by the gen-
eralized configuration constructed by the first generalization. Thus there is the only variable to be
nontrivially substituted by this folding. The variable is the accumulating parameter introduced by
this generalization.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137):(Dirty ):(Valid I I e.138 ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137) : (Dirty ):(Valid I I e.138 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137):(Dirty ):(Valid I e.138 ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137) : (Dirty ):(Valid I e.138 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
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e.136 := e.136; e.137 := e.137; e.138 := I : e.138;
2. Folding-2: The second folding action was performed by the first generalized configuration itself.
The folded configuration ends a branch following the iteration of the protocol event rm.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid I e.137 ):(Dirty ):(Valid I [] ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid I e.137 ) : (Dirty ):(Valid I [] ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137 ):(Dirty ):(Valid I e.138 ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137 ) : (Dirty ):(Valid I e.138 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
e.136 := e.136; e.137 := I : e.137; e.138 := [];
3. Folding-3: The third folding action was done by a regular configuration C1 below. Configuration
C1 is a descendant of the generalized configuration Cg1 constructed by the first generalization. The
folded configuration ends a branch following the iteration of the protocol event wm. The cor-
responding substitution is completely trivial, i. e., the folded and folding configurations coincide
modulo variables names.
The sub-tree rooted in C1 is completely folded. Configuration C1 is declared as an entry point of
a residual function definition. The fist rewriting rule of this definition is an exit from a recursion
returning the value True, while the second and third branches refer to Cg1 and C1, respectively.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid I e.137 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ) , • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid I e.137 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
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The substitution:
e.136 := e.136; e.137 := I : e.137;
Function F1047(e.136,e.137) has been created.
4. Folding-4: The fourth folded configuration is a descendent of configuration Cg2 . It was folded
by the regular configuration C1 used in the third folding. The corresponding substitution is quite
trivial. There are two parameters in both the folded and folding configurations. The folding sub-
stitution renames the parameter corresponding to the initial unknown data e.time and replaces the
parameter standing for the unknown value of the Invalid counter with concatenation of completely
unknown data early split into three parts.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.206, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ,
(Invalid e.207 ++ e.203 ++ e.215 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ) , • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.206) : (Invalid e.207 ++ e.203 ++ e.215 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
e.136 := e.136; e.137 := e.207 ++ e.203 ++ e.215;
5. Folding-5: The fifth folded configuration is a descendent of configuration Cg2 and it is folded
by Cg2 as well. There are thirteen parameters occurring in Cg2 . Fife parameters are substituted
with expressions containing names and/or types of some variables from the Synapse program
model. One parameter is replaced with an expression including an application Eval that presents a
generalized environment of this program model.
The sub-tree rooted in Cg2 is completely folded. Configuration Cg2 is declared as an entry point
of a residual function definition. The fist rewriting rule of this definition refers to C1, while the
seconds one refers toCg2 , i. e., to itself.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.202, ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.203 ) , • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.202 ) : (e.203 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
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EvalCall( Loop, ( e.206) : ( Invalid e.207 ++ s.223 ++ • ++
Eval( (( e. ys ) : e.203 : ( s . x : s.223 ) : ( e. xs : e.202 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.s.208 : e.209 ) : (s.210.s.211 : e.212 ) : (e.s.213 : e.214 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++ e.215
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : e.216 ) : (e.is : e.203) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.216) : (e.is : e.203) : (s.t : wh2) : (e.time : e.206) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.202, ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.203 ) , • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.202 ) : (e.203 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.206) : ( Invalid e.207 ++ • ++
Eval( (( e. s.208 : e.209 ) : ( s.210 . s.211 : e.212 ) : ( e. s.213 : e.214 )) : [],
(Prog Synapse) )
++ e.215
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : e.216 ) : (e.is : e.203) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.216) : (e.is : e.203) : (s.t : wh2) : (e.time : e.206) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
e.202 := e.202; e.207 := e.207 s.223; s.208 := ys; e.209 := e.203;
s.210 := ’s’; s.211 := x; e.212 := s.223; s.213 := xs; e.214 := e.202;
e.215 := Eval( ((e.s.208 : e.209) : (s.210.s.211 : e.212) : (e.s.213 : e.214)) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ) ++ e.215;
e.216 := e.216; e.203 := e.203; e.206 := e.206;
Function
F1646(e.202,e.203,e.206,e.207,s.208,e.209,s.210,s.211,e.212,s.213,e.214,e.215,e.216)
has been created.
6. Folding-6: The sixth folding action was done by the regular configuration C1 used above. The
folding substitution increases counter Invalid and renames the variable corresponding to stream
e.time.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid I e.137 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ) , • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
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( e.136) : (Invalid I e.137 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.136, ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
e.136 := e.136; e.137 := I : e.137;
7. Folding-7: The seventh folding action was done in a similar context as the fourth one done. The
only distinction consists in increasing the Invalid counter by a constant.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.254 , ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ,
(Invalid I e.255 ++ e.251 ++ e.266 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ) , • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid I e.255 ++ e.251 ++ e.266 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.136 , ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
e.254 := e.136; e.137 := I : e.255 ++ e.251 ++ e.266;
8. Folding-8: The eighth folded configuration is a descendent of configuration Cg3 and it is folded
by Cg3 as well. The corresponding folding substitution has the badness similar to the fifth folding
substitution.
The sub-tree rooted in Cg3 is completely folded. Configuration Cg3 is declared as an entry point
of a residual function definition. The fist rewriting rule of this definition refers to C1, while the
seconds one refers toCg3 , i. e., to itself.
That in its turn allows us to fold the sub-tree rooted in the first generalized configuration Cg1 .
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Configuration Cg1 is declared as an entry point of a residual function definition. The fist rewriting
rule of this definition is an exit from a recursion returning the value True. The second rewriting
rule calls this entry pointCg1 , while the third and fourth branches refer toCg2 andCg3 , respectively.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.250, ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.251 ) , • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.250 ) : (e.251 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.254) : ( Invalid I : e.255 ++ s.274 ++ • ++
Eval( (( e.ys : e.251 : )(s.x : s.274 ) : (e.xs) : e.250 ) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( (( e. ys ) : e.251 : ( s . x : s.257 ) : ( e. xs : s.274 e.250 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.s.259 : e.260 ) : (s.261.s.262 : e.263 ) : (e.s.264 : e.265 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++ 266
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.267) : (e.is : e.251) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.267) : (e.is : I : e.251) : (s.t : wm) : (e.time : e.254) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.250, ([]) ),
Match( (e.ys), ( e.251 ) , • ),
Matching( •, e.ys, . . . The 2-nd Append rule . . . , ( e.250 ) : (e.251 ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) ),
EvalCall( Loop, ( e.254) : ( Invalid I : e.255 ++ • ++
Eval( ((e.ys) : e.251 : (s.x : s.257 ) : (e.xs : e.250 )) : [], (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( (( e. s.259 : e.260 ) : ( s.261 . s.262 : e.263 ) : ( e. s.264 : e.265 )) : [],
(Prog Synapse) )
++ e.266
) :
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.267 ) : (e.is : e.251) : (e.ds : [])) : (Dirty I) : (Valid ), (Prog Synapse) ) ++
Eval( ((e.vs : I : e.267) : (e.is : I : e.251) : (s.t : wm) : (e.time : e.254) : (e.ds : [])) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ), (Prog Synapse)
),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
e.255 := e.255 ++ s.274; s.257 := s.274; e.250 := e.250; s.259 := ys;
e.260 := e.251; s.261 := ’s’; s.262 := x; e.263 := s.257;
s.264 := xs; e.265 := s.274 e.250;
e.266 := Eval( ((e.s.259 : e.260) : (s.261.s.262 : e.263) : (e.s.264 : e.265)) : [],
(Prog Synapse) ) ++ e.266;
e.267 := e.267; e.251 := e.251; e.254 := e.254;
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Function
F1959(e.249,e.250,e.253,e.254,s.256,s.258,e.259,s.260,s.261,e.262,
s.263,e.264,e.265,e.266) has been created.
Function F637(e.136,e.137,e.138) has been created.
9. Folding-9: The last folded configuration belongs to the last branch originating from the initial
configuration. It is folded by the regular configuration C1, which belongs to a parallel path and
was used in the third folding.
The current configuration:
Match( [], e.101 , ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.102 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ) , • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.101) : (Invalid e.102 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
To the previous configuration:
Match( [], e.136 , ([]) ),
Match( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs), (Invalid e.137 ):(Dirty I ):(Valid ), • ),
Matching( •, Test( (Invalid e.is) : (Dirty e.ds) : (Valid e.vs) ), . . . The 2-nd Loop rule . . . ,
( e.136) : (Invalid e.137 ) : (Dirty I ):(Valid ) ),
Eval( • , (Prog Synapse) )
The substitution:
e.136 := e.101; e.137 := e.102;
